Agricultural markets in OECD countries have long been highly distorted by government policies. Traditional weighted average aggregates of the price distortions involved, such as producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs), can be poor indicators of the trade restrictiveness and economic welfare losses associated with them, especially if a country's support estimates vary a lot across the product range. Certainly estimates of trade and welfare effects of price supports can be obtained from sectoral or economywide models using price elasticity estimates, but the results can be contentious if there is no consensus on what model specification and elasticity parameters to use. This paper shows that, if there is a willingness to accept simple assumptions about elasticities, it is possible to generate indicators of the welfare and trade restrictiveness of agricultural policies using no more than the price and quantity data needed to generate PSEs and CSEs. These new indexes thus provide an attractive supplement to the current policy monitoring regime developed by the OECD Secretariat.
A recent global World Bank study (Anderson 2009 ) complements and extends the OECD's efforts by providing similar estimates for a longer time period (back to 1955) and for individual member countries of the European Union. It also has comparable estimates for 45 other countries at different stages of economic development and includes a time series of rates of assistance to producers of nonagricultural goods, to compare with agricultural distortion estimates.
The OECD and World Bank measures for each product are aggregated using the value of production and consumption as weights to obtain an annual average PSE and CSE for each country. That traditional aggregation method provides a reasonable indicator of the average price distortion across that country's product set, but it is not necessarily a good indicator of the distortion to the volume of trade in farm products because that depends also on the responsiveness of domestic supply and demand to price changes (that is, price elasticities), and on whether there are any negative PSEs that are offsetting positive ones in the aggregating process. It is an even poorer indicator of the national welfare cost of that country's farm price and trade policies, because for each product that cost is related to the square of the rate of price distortion and so the total cost depends on the extent of dispersion in product PSEs and CSEs.
Certainly one can use the OECD or World Bank price distortions as inputs into national partial or general equilibrium models to estimate the trade-and welfarereducing effects of a country's agricultural policies (as in, for example, Anderson and Valenzuela 2007) . However, such models are computationally intensive, and the results can be contentious if there is no consensus on what model specification and parameters such as elasticities to use. Even more problematic is that typically they are calibrated only for a particular past year and so are not able to provide a time series of estimated economic effects.
An alternative is to use the raw data in the OECD and World Bank studies to calculate indexes of the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of policies. Anderson and Neary (2005) specify a simple, elegant and theoretically meaningful methodology to provide such measures as a supplement to aggregate PSEs and CSEs.
The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how the Anderson and Neary methodology can be applied using no more information than that assembled already to generate price distortion estimates for OECD member countries. The method may have been ignored to date because it was traditionally thought that price elasticity estimates were necessary to estimate such indexes. However, it has recently been shown by Lloyd et al. (2010) that by assuming domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across commodities within a country, and likewise for price elasticities of demand, the index number formulae simplify to a share-weighted function using shares of production and consumption as weights. The resulting measures thereby can be generated as supplements to the current policy monitoring indicators generated by the OECD Secretariat without having to tackle the contentious questions associated with the size of price elasticities (such as whether they refer to the short or long run) and without having to continually update a sectoral or economywide model. Drawing on the Anderson and Neary framework, we estimate two indexes which go by the precise descriptors of a trade reduction index (TRI) and a welfare reduction index (WRI). The TRI and WRI are each computed from sub-indexes of the production and consumption sides of the market (the producer and consumer distortion indexes, PDI and CDI), which are derived from nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and consumer tax equivalent (CTE) estimates for individual products, respectively, from the World Bank's database. 1 NRAs to producers and CTEs to consumers differ whenever there are domestic subsidies or taxes on production or consumption in addition to border measures. Thus the indexes capture in a single scalar number the aggregate trade-or welfare-reducing effects of all policies directly affecting consumer and producer prices of farm products from all measures in place.
Non-product-specific distortions are not captured in the indexes, which by construction aggregate only product-specific data. However, we attempt to gauge the importance of this limitation in the final section of the paper.
The present paper is aimed at encouraging not only the OECD to add these indexes to their current set of indicators calculated each year, but also developing country governments or policy think-tanks to generate them so as to be able to Section 2 presents the methodology for computing partial-equilibrium trade and welfare reduction indexes. Section 3 outlines the data in the World Bank's database, which are used for computing the indexes. In Section 4 the index results are presented and discussed, followed by Section 5 addressing several caveats. Section 6 concludes with lessons learned and areas for further research.
Methodology
There is a growing literature that identifies ways to measure the trade-and welfare- (2009) report two series of indexes, one based on tariffs only and the other on tariffs plus non-tariff import barriers. While they may be the dominant instruments for nonfarm products, the agricultural sectors of OECD countries have been subject also to numerous domestic and export subsidies; and, in developing countries, agricultural production and export taxes also have been used.
decades to forms of support at least somewhat decoupled from production.
Notwithstanding this limitation, below we estimate the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of individual policy instruments. We assume that border measures are applied first, and this may be supplemented by additional domestic distortions. This allocation assumption provides an upper-bound on welfare losses from border measures and a lower bound on welfare losses from domestic measures. An attempt is made in the empirical section below to gauge the potential importance of non-product-specific support measures which are excluded from the formal ITRI and IWRI measures.
We also report commodity level TRI and WRI indexes below, which give the aggregate trade-and welfare-reducing effects of OECD member country policies to individual commodity markets. These indexes are computed using a methodology similar to that in Box 1, but where distortions are summed across countries for an individual commodity, instead of across commodities for an individual country.
Croser et al. (2010) provide a detailed exposition of the methodology as it applies to individual commodity markets globally. Below we provide them for the subset of countries that are OECD members.
Data
This study makes use of data from the World Bank's Distortions to Agricultural Where and when multiple exchange rates operated, estimates of the import and export tax equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The range of measures included in the CTE estimates includes both domestic consumer taxes and subsidies and trade and exchange rate policies, all of which drive a wedge between the price that consumers pay for each commodity and the international price at the border. countries, using data that has been disaggregated in some instances from regional aggregates. The aggregate NRA and CTE results from this study are reported at the country level in Tables 1 and 2 . (Appendix Table 1 lists the changing membership of the regional EU and EFTA blocs.) It confirms that Western European agricultural policy is characterized by high levels of assistance throughout the postwar period, albeit with declines for some countries since the mid-1980s. The latter is largely due to some reinstrumentation of agricultural policy away from import protection for specific commodities toward direct payments that are supported for socially responsible farming.
Anderson and Swinnen (2009) summarize agricultural policy in 18 of
Europe's transition economies, drawing on their more-detailed book (Anderson and Swinnen 2008) . Despite the heterogeneity of reform experiences, they note some overall patterns. In the early 1990s, when reliable data for these regions are first available, support to agriculture is at reasonably low levels. This is because many trade and price distortions were removed throughout the region at the start of the reform period in the early 1990s. Since that time, changes in agricultural policy have tended to be characterized overall by stop-go phases, and sometimes reversals of previous reforms. In the period 2000 to 2007, NRAs were on average higher than they were in the decade of the 1990s.
Honma and Hayami (2009) provide a study of agricultural policy in
Northeast Asia over the past 50 years, illustrating the dramatic growth that can occur in distortions to agricultural incentives as real incomes grow. Distortions in these two countries are currently at high levels, driven by border protection for import-competing food products.
North America's and Oceania's lower levels of agricultural policy distortion contrast with those of Europe and Northeast Asia. In the United States and Canada, real spending on agricultural support has not diminished greatly over time (Gardner 2009 ). By contrast, in Australia and New Zealand, there was a rapid dismantling of agricultural policy support from the 1980s, which has resulted in Oceania having the lowest levels of distortion among OECD countries (Anderson et al. 2009 ).
The country level aggregate measures in Tables 1 and 2 Agricultural policies in the focus countries were becoming less trade restrictive in this period in an aggregate sense (even though the NRA is increasing) because assistance was increasing for exportable products, in the form of export subsidies, which offset somewhat the trade-restrictive effect of import restrictions.
TRI and WRI estimates
The WRI results reveal that over the period shown the aggregate NRA measure greatly understates the extent of welfare losses from agricultural and trade policies ( Figure 2 and Table 4 ). Figure 2 shows that for EU countries the extent of understatement is greatest in the 1970s, and for the 34 focus countries the understatement is greatest in 1985-89. These large gaps coincide with world pricespikes. The 1985-89 period is when a downward price spike resulted in importcompeting products being more distorted relative to export products, and conversely for the 1975-79 period.
The fall in the WRI for EU countries is dramatic following the peak in the early 1980s, and more dramatic than the fall in the EU's aggregate NRA over the same time period (Figure 2 ). From the peak in 1980-84, there is a fall in both the weighted mean and the weighted variance of producer (consumer) distortions. Thus, the two elements of the WRI are falling, resulting in a steeper decline in the WRI than the NRA. This shows one of the benefits of generating a WRI: it provides a better sense of welfare improvements from policy reforms that reduce assistance to covered farm products. It should be noted, however, that from the mid-1980s, OECD members moved towards a reinstrumentation of agricultural policy, which is not fully reflected in the WRI and TRI estimates presented in Figure 2 (see next section).
The individual country WRI results are presented in The country-level WRI measures, which are derived using an overall measure of the distortion to producer and consumer prices in individual sectors of the 34 focus countries, masks the contribution of different policy instruments to welfare losses in each country. Figure 3 reports the decomposition of the overall country WRI by policy instrument for the 6 key regional groups. The decomposition is found by estimating WRI series for individual policy measures, and then apportioning the shares of these series to the overall WRI. In our 34 focus countries as a whole, border measures -which distort both producer and consumer prices -are by far the most significant of the distorting policy instruments. They account for upwards of 90 percent of the welfare losses in all 6 subregions over time, with the proportion being above 97 percent in most instances.
The decomposition of border measures in Figure 3 (a) shows that import tariffs are the dominant measure of distortion in terms of market price support in most regions. In the European Union and Northeast Asia, in particular, import taxes dominate border supports. In EFTA countries, import tariffs also dominate but these countries together also have significant export subsidies. Oceania has significant export subsidies in 1980-84, but they are reduced over time along with other reductions in policy distortions in those countries. Data are available only from 1992
for Eastern Europe's transition economies. In 2000-04, this subregion has a range of distortionary policy instruments in use: import taxes dominate, but export taxes and subsidies are also present.
The final perspective from which to consider the trade-and welfare-reducing effects of policies in our 34 focus countries is at the commodity market level, for individual commodities. Figure 4 (a) shows that rice is the most distorted commodity market across the 34 focus countries. This is followed by a group of vegetable products, which are heavily protected in Japan and Korea. The sugar, oilseed, milk, beef and cotton markets are the next most heavily distorted markets. The results for just the EU market indicate that sugar and livestock products are most heavily distorted in that region.
Caveats and Sensitivity Analysis
Some important caveats need to be mentioned, because the paper's two main indexes have been calculated with the help of a number of simplifying assumptions. One key assumption is that each country's own-price elasticity of supply (and also of demand)
for a particular product is the same as that for every other product, and that cross-price elasticities are zero. It is not uncommon for modelers of the global market for particular farm products to adopt these assumptions, for want of reliable or agreed Notwithstanding those expectations, to gauge the potential importance of not allowing differential price responses we re-compute our two country-level indexes using country-and commodity-specific own-price elasticity of supply and demand estimates available for 27 key farm products from widely cited sources (Roningen Table 5 , it is clear that in all cases, the index trends over time are much the same under either set of elasticity assumptions, and they give a better indication of the trade reduction and welfare losses from agricultural policies than standard weighted aggregates of NRAs and CTEs.
2001; Tyers and Anderson 1992). A comparison in
Our other assumption -that the aggregate marginal response of domestic demand to a price change is the same as the aggregate marginal response of domestic supply-might also have an impact on the results. We re-compute our two indexes assuming that demand was instead twice, or half, as responsive as supply. Despite that wide range, the estimates were almost unchanged at the aggregate level across the six regional groups. This benign result is due to the empirical fact that the producer and consumer distortions are similar, reflecting the dominance of border measures in the policy instrument mix.
A third caveat on the results for the TRI and WRI by policy instrument is the exclusion of non-product-specific (NPS) distortions in the estimates. In the Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) database, NPS assistance can be a significant component of overall agricultural sector distortions in some OECD countries. NPS is reported in three forms in the database: general NPS assistance, input subsidies that are not 6 Thus the size and ranking of the commodity indexes for the OECD country group, summarized in Figure 4 , also would be affected somewhat by using differential elasticity estimates. Croser et al.
(2010) examine this at the global level for eight major agricultural products and find that, if the elasticities found in Tyers and Anderson (1992) are used, there is little difference in the overall indications of distortions: the index averages using the elasticity estimates are 5 percentage points lower than the estimates using the simpler elasticity assumptions for one decade, but are between just 0 and 3 points lower for the other seven decade averages shown. Not surprisingly the differences are largest for the product with the most diverse NRAs, namely rice. In all cases, the global commodity index trends over time are much the same under either set of elasticity assumptions.
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